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Statutory Aggravation by Religious Prejudice in Scotland: Correcting the 
‘The Lord Advocate’s Lacuna.’  
 
This article represents the outcome of research undertaken into the current state of Scots Law 
regarding the statutory aggravation of a substantive offence by religious prejudice. The 
research was inspired by the news in August 2016 that the Lord Advocate, James Wolffe, 
QC, had written to the Scottish Justice Secretary Michael Mathieson following the conviction 
and sentencing of Tanveer Ahmed for the religiously-motivated murder of Asad Shah.1 The 
Lord Advocate raised the issue of a potential gap in the law (the Lord Advocate’s lacuna) 
arising from a ‘decision by senior Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) 
counsel that the circumstances of the killing did not meet the statutory test for an offence to 
be aggravated by religious prejudice’.2 Mr Mathieson indicated that the Scottish government 
would consider…[the Lord Advocate’s letter]…very carefully, and if necessary…bring 
forward legislation to address this very issue’.3 It is noteworthy that Lady Rae, in imposing 
an ‘exemplary sentence’ appeared to implicitly acknowledge the lacuna’s existence.4 It could 
be argued that her sentence, coupled with the Appeal Court’s refusal of Mr Ahmed’s appeal 
against it and the media’s coverage of the crime has sufficiently replicated the statutory 
aggravation regime so as to compensate for the consequences of the existence of the Lord 
Advocate’s lacuna. This does not however compensate for the fact of its existence. 
 Without prejudice to the recently announced Bracadale Inquiry,5 this article concurs with the 
Lord Advocate’s opinion. A condensed version of its findings has already been forwarded to 
the Lord Advocate’s Office and to the Scottish Justice Secretary in letter format. It 
recommends a simple amendment to the relevant Scottish statutory test for aggravation by 
                                                          
1 Ahmed had pleaded guilty on 7th July 2016 to Mr Shah’s killing. On 9th August 2016, he was sentenced to 27 
years’ imprisonment. His appeal against sentence was refused on 29 November 2016. 
2 Matt Coyle, ‘Asad Shah killer jailed for 27 years for murdering shopkeeper’ (STV NEWS,9 August 2016) 
<http://stv.tv/news/west-central/1363310-asad-shah-killer-jailed-for-27-years-for-murdering-shopkeeper/> 
accessed 11 November 2016 
3 Andrew Whitaker, ‘Asad Shah Murder Case Leads to Law Review’ (Holyrood, 10 August 2016)  
<www.holyrood.com/articles/news/asad-shah-murder-case-leads-law-review> accessed 22 November 2016 
4 Sentencing Statement of Lady Rae, ‘HMA v Tanveer Ahmed’ (Judiciary of Scotland, 9 August 2016) 
<www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/8/1639/HMA-v-Tanveer-Ahmed> accessed 20 December 2016. Lady Rae 
stated, inter alia, that she would ‘have regard to the various factors put forward as mitigation but none of 
them…truly mitigate[d], to any great extent, the brutality…premeditation and motive behind those 
actions…[the]…lack of remorse…[and Ahmed’s pride in those actions]. For all of these reasons she imposed an 
exemplary sentence. 
5Untitled, ‘Review of hate crime legislation’ (Scottish Government website, 26 January 2017) 
<http://news.gov.scot/news/hate-crime-legislation-review> accessed 6 February 2017 
  
religious prejudice, namely the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, s74(2). This involves 
inserting an additional stand-alone clause that provides for ‘the evincing by an offender of 
malice and ill-will towards their victim based on the victim’s expression of personal religious 
belief(s)’ This would correct the Lord Advocate’s lacuna and would not involve the 
enactment of completely new legislation. 
In making its case, the article will firstly demonstrate that Tanveer Ahmed’s conduct in 
murdering Asad Shah was undoubtedly motivated by religious prejudice as a matter of fact, 
if not, as the Lord Advocate’s lacuna demonstrates, as a matter of law.  
After briefly examining the misconception that statutory aggravations provide ‘protection’ for 
victims of prejudice-motivated crime, the article will then examine the chronological 
development of prejudice-based legislation in the UK. This will clearly demonstrate that the 
Lord Advocate’s lacuna arises from the rigid adherence of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
Act 2003, section 74, to an established drafting formula originally created in UK statutes 
addressing racial prejudice. It will then demonstrate how the later Offences (Aggravation by 
Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009 correctly addressed disability and sexual orientation prejudice 
by providing for individuals, whether or not those individuals constituted part of a wider 
societal vulnerable group.6  
It will be shown that the drafting formula in all Scottish statutory aggravation provision  
reflects, to varying degrees, the absorption into EU, UK and Scottish policymaking of three 
policy rationales for regulating prejudice-motivated crime, namely Barendt’s ‘public order’, 
‘abhorrence’ and ‘vulnerable group’ rationales.7 It will be further shown that it is the third 
rationale, or ‘group mentality’ that has assumed primacy in the relevant UK and Scottish 
legislation. As far back as 1963, the UK Parliament presciently acknowledged the 
difficulties 8  of drafting legislation around ‘artificial cultural constructs’ such as racial 
categorisation.9 This article proceeds on the view that one unintended consequence of doing 
                                                          
6 Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009, ss1-2  
7Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP, 2007)  177 
8 See for example Public Order Bill debate, HL Deb 3 July 1963 vol 252, col 963 per Lord Conesford ‘I do not 
believe that it is a good thing to incite people to hate other people…but if these words were put in, what is the 
reason for this curious limitation and selection of the hatreds that are to be prohibited out of the many hatreds 
which are presumably not to be prohibited? Why only hatred on grounds of religion, race or colour? What about 
hatred on grounds of lawful occupations? What about hatred on grounds of a trade or profession which 
somebody is pursuing? What about incitement to hatred of landlords, which sometimes appears in political 
speeches? What about incitement to hatred of political Parties?’ 
9 See John T Omohundro, Thinking Like an Anthropologist: A Practical Introduction to Cultural Anthropology 
(McGraw Hill, New York, 2008) 33. The author defines ‘cultural construct’ as a conceptual model of reality 
  
so has been the manifestation of the Lord Advocate’s lacuna. The main argument of this 
article is that the Scottish legislature, in seeking to follow a laudable policy aspiration to 
provide for aggravation by religious prejudice in terms of ‘protecting’ perceived members of 
‘religious groups’, has failed to acknowledge the sui generis conceptual nature of personal 
religious expression as articulated in European law and jurisprudence, wherein, it will be 
argued, membership of some wider vulnerable societal group is not actually required. It will 
be further argued that the sui generis nature of personal religious expression necessitates 
statutory acknowledgment of the vulnerability of individuals expressing their own personal 
take on their religious beliefs, if such ‘protection’ is to be truly credible and comprehensive. 
It will then articulate the essence of the Lord Advocate’s lacuna and assert the view that as 
the law stands, Scotland offers insufficient remedial comfort to individual victims of religious 
prejudice-motivated crime (such as the family of Asad Shah) in contravention of a number of 
internationally recognised instruments. In line with the recent view of the Lord Advocate and 
Secretary of State for Justice, the article concludes by offering the legislative solution 
outlined previously.   
The Misconception of Statutory Aggravations as ‘Protective’ 
The Scottish Parliament and Government have frequently expressed the view that the Scottish 
statutory aggravation framework provides ‘protection’ to vulnerable sections of society. For 
example, the stated policy objective underpinning the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) 
(Scotland) Bill (now the 2009 Act) was: 
to create new statutory aggravations to protect victims of crime who are targeted as a result of 
hatred of their actual or presumed sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability. 
Similar statutory aggravations already exist to protect individuals and groups targeted on 
racial or religious grounds.10 
This objective repeated the aspirations stated by then Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill 
during the Scottish Parliament’s debate on the same Bill.11 Later in the same debate however, 
he subsequently clarified the official and correct position:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
shared by a group, but argues cogently that racial categorisation is a flawed model of reality, used principally to 
justify colonization from the 16th century onwards. 
10 Scottish Parliament, Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) Scotland Bill SP 9, Policy Memorandum 
<www.parliament.scot/S3_Bills/Offences%20(Aggravation%20by%20Prejudice)%20(Scotland)%20Bill/BBV_
133.pdf> para 3, accessed 31 January 2017 emphasis added 
11 Scottish Parliament Official Report, 18 March 2009, Question Time, on motion S3M-3694, in the name of 
Patrick Harvie, on the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Bill, per Kenny MacAskill, ‘People—
whoever they are, whatever disability they are afflicted by and whatever sexual orientation they possess—are 
  
[Statutory Aggravations]…help to underline the seriousness with which hate crime is 
viewed…[and]…help to ensure a consistent approach from law enforcement and criminal justice 
agencies…[they]…have been shown to serve a number of purposes: they ensure that, throughout 
Scotland, there are appropriate and consistent reporting and prosecution policies from the various 
agencies in the criminal justice system; they send a clear message that prejudice and hatred towards 
social groups as a motive for committing a crime are unacceptable and will not be tolerated; and they 
allow us to monitor the extent of such crimes in Scotland and tailor our approaches to tackling them.12 
Mr MacAskill’s clarification proves that, whilst adding value in the form of recording and 
monitoring, and a degree of largely subjective deterrence value, the statutory aggravations 
regime cannot be said to protect any classification of individual or group from prejudice-
motivated offending. Such measures represent, at best, ex post facto remedial ‘reassurance’ 
provisions designed to mitigate the post-traumatic effects experienced by victims of 
prejudice-motivated offending and provide supplementary State recognition of them as one of 
several ‘vulnerable sections of society’.13 Scotland’s statutory aggravation regime represents 
the best that the state can offer victims after the fact of failure to prevent prejudice-related 
offending through optimal measures such as inter-group contact and education intervention.14 
The Current Scottish Statutory Aggravation by Prejudice Regime 
 That said, the regime, bolstered by the improvements wrought by the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, 15  provides for the following common consequences 
imposable upon a finding of any aggravation by prejudice in Scotland. Courts must: label the 
offending as motivated by a particular form of prejudice;16 record the conviction in a way 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
entitled to the full protection of the law, to be treated with dignity and compassion, and to be fully and properly 
protected. The aggravations that are created by the bill will protect victims of crime who have been targeted as 
a result of their sexual orientation, transgender identity or disability—actual or presumed (emphasis added) 
12 Scottish Parliament Official Report, 18 March 2009, Question Time, on motion S3M-3694, in the name of 
Patrick Harvie, on the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Bill. 
13 Sara Stewart (Criminal Law & Licensing Division), ‘Introduction of the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) 
(Scotland) Bill: Background briefing to accompany SCANCE Note (16 May 2008)  
<www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/3772/response/10978/attach/29/024.pdf> accessed 31 January 2017 
14Maureen McBride,  Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, What works to reduce prejudice and 
discrimination? A review of the evidence (Scottish Government, 2015) 3-4  
15 Explanatory Note to Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s25 states that s25 (1) substitutes 
subsection (5) of section 96 of the [Crime and Disorder Act]1998 [and] requires that, where an aggravation 
relating to prejudice is proved, the court must also explain how the aggravation has affected the sentence (if at 
all – and if not, then the reasons for this) and record the conviction in a manner which shows that the offence 
was aggravated by prejudice related to race. S.25 (2)(a) inserts a new subsection (2A) into section 74 of the 
[Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act] 2003. This provides that the aggravation can apply even if prejudice relating to 
religion is not the sole motivation for the offence. This is already the case for racial aggravations and therefore 
ensures consistency between the two provisions. S25 (2)(b) replaces subsections (3) and (4) of section 74 of the 
2003 Act with subsection (4A), which requires that, where an aggravation relating to prejudice is proved, the 
court must explain how the aggravation has affected the sentence (if at all – and if not, then the reasons for this) 
and record the conviction in a manner which shows that the offence was aggravated by prejudice related to 
religion. 
16 For present purposes see Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, s74(4A)(a) 
  
that shows that the offence was so aggravated; 17  take the aggravation into account in 
determining the appropriate sentence;18 and state either, where the sentence in respect of the 
offence is different from that which the court would have imposed if the offence were not so 
aggravated, the extent of and the reasons for that difference, or where otherwise, the reasons 
for there being no such difference19. Although corroborative evidence is required in proving 
the particular substantive offence, the requirement is removed as regards proving the 
aggravation by prejudice.20 Although the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 
2009 (as amended) has brought about a ‘welcome harmonisation of aggravations across all 
areas’,21 there exists criticism in some quarters of the failure to embrace provisions in the 
areas of aggravation by age-related prejudice and gender prejudice.22 At the time of writing, 
Lord Bracadale has been announced as the Chair of a 12 month inquiry into: the Criminal 
Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995; Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003; Offences 
(Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009 and the controversial Offensive Behaviour at 
Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012.23  
Was Tanveer Ahmed’s murder of Asad Shah motivated by religious prejudice? 
Lady Rae observed that Ahmed’s murder of Mr Shah:  
was a brutal, barbaric and horrific crime, resulting from intolerance and which led to the death of a 
wholly innocent man who openly expressed beliefs which differed from...[those of Tanveer 
Ahmed]…this was a religiously motivated crime, although it was not directed towards the Ahmadi 
community…[a branch of the Muslim faith of which Asad Shah professed adherence]24 
Lady Rae’s conclusions in the agreed narrative are founded on the fact that Tanveer Ahmed 
unashamedly and unrepentantly admitted (via a statement made on his behalf by his solicitor) 
that his conduct was motivated by his religious intolerance of the religious beliefs as 
                                                          
17 ibid, s74(4A)(b) 
18 ibid, s74(4A)(c) 
19 ibid, s74(4A)(d) 
20 ibid, s74(5) 
21 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill, Written submission from the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (2009) available at 
<http://archive.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/justice/inquiries/CriminalJusticeandLicensing/CJL81.pdf> 
accessed 31 January 2017 
22   Law Society of Scotland, ‘Scottish Government Debate: Working Together to Prevent and Eradicate Hate 
Crime and Prejudice, The Law Society of Scotland’s Briefing for MSPs’ (Law Society of Scotland, 9 November 
2016) 7,  < www.lawscot.org.uk/media/948527/crim-briefing-scottish-government-debate-working-together-to-
prevent-and-eradicate-hate-crime-and-prejudice-november-2016-3-.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016 
23 Bracadale Inquiry (n5)  
24 Sentencing statement of Lady Rae (n4)  
  
expressed by his victim.25 Lady Rae’s use of the term ‘intolerance’, as opposed to ‘prejudice’ 
in her statement is somewhat unfortunate, as Scots Law currently does not make common law 
or statutory provision for ‘intolerance’. A description of Ahmed’s conduct as motivated by 
‘religious prejudice’ would have perhaps served to narrow the gap identified by the Lord 
Advocate. Her words exemplify an apparent degree of inconsistency in Scottish society and 
Scots law as regards the usage and interpretation of the terms ‘hate crime’, ‘intolerance’, 
‘offensive’ and ‘prejudice’. Indeed, the specialist advisory group recently established by 
Scottish Ministers to examine the issue reported that, in the Scottish context, ‘hate crime’ 
remains ‘relatively poorly defined and understood, both in terms how it is defined, and what 
the law says…the criminal law deals with ‘prejudice’ rather than hate’.26 However, if literal 
(rather than legislative) English is applied to the Lord Advocate’s lacuna, it is plain that 
‘intolerance’ (unwillingness to accept views, beliefs, or behaviour that differ from one's 
own)27 and ‘prejudice’ (dislike, hostility, or unjust behaviour deriving from preconceived and 
unfounded opinions)28 are readily interchangeable. It is therefore not difficult to concur with 
Lady Rae’s and Tanveer Ahmed’s statements that the brutal murder of Mr Shah was, as a 
matter of fact, motivated by religious prejudice. Of course the issue raised by the Lord 
Advocate is that the circumstances of the murder were not, as a matter of law, aggravated by 
religious prejudice. A question therefore arises as to why the Scots law purporting to 
recognise that offending is aggravated if it is motivated by religious prejudice failed to do so 
in the case of Asad Shah. 
Despite the inconsistencies previously referred to, it is acknowledged that Scottish courts 
possess longstanding common law powers to punish offenders more severely for the 
commission of crimes motivated by prejudice by taking into account aggravating factors 
when sentencing.29 These have been complemented by a number of ‘statutory aggravations 
                                                          
25Ahmed, a Muslim, claimed inter alia, that ‘Asad Shah disrespected the messenger of Islam the Prophet 
Muhammad…[by claiming]…to be a Prophet’, see BBC News ‘Asad Shah death: Man admits killing 
shopkeeper because he 'disrespected' Islam’, BBC News (6th April 2016) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-
glasgow-west-35976958>accessed 11 November 2016  
26One Scotland, Report of the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion 
(Secretariat to the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion, September 
2016) 11 
27 Definition of ‘intolerance’ (Oxford English Dictionary)  
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/intolerance> accessed 22 November 2016 
28 Definition of ‘prejudice’ (Oxford English Dictionary) 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/prejudice> accessed 22 November 2016 
29 One Scotland, Report of the IAG (n26) 7 
  
for criminal offences and substantive criminal law offences’.30 Leaving aside the debate over 
terminology and any potential benefits of consolidation,31 Scots law’s statutory aggravations 
include aggravation of substantive criminal offences by: racial prejudice; 32  religious 
prejudice; 33  disability prejudice; 34  sexual orientation prejudice 35  and transgender identity 
prejudice.36 An understanding of these contemporary Scots law provisions is best achieved 
by tracing their chronological evolution. This of course predates the 1998 statutory 
devolution settlement that saw legislative competence for criminal justice largely devolved to 
the new Scottish Parliament.37 The earliest provisions relate to racial prejudice, and it will be 
shown that the later attempts to regulate other forms of prejudice are drafted in a similar, but 
in one aspect crucially different manner. 
Barendt’s Rationales for Proscribing Prejudice-based Offending: the Origins of the 
‘Group Mentality’ in UK Legislation 
Although outside the analytical scope of this article, there is some utility in referring to the 
rationale(s) underpinning the modern law regulating prejudice-motivated offending in the 
EU, UK and latterly in Scotland. This is because rationales inform legislative drafting and it 
is the drafting of the current Scottish legislative provisions relating to aggravation by 
religious prejudice-motivated offending that will be shown to constitute the Lord Advocate’s 
lacuna. In assessing the arguments for and against the proscription of racist hate speech,38 
Barendt referred to three justificatory rationales.  
The Public Order Rationale 
                                                          
30 Law Society of Scotland, ‘Scottish Government Debate: Working Together to Prevent and Eradicate Hate 
Crime and Prejudice, The Law Society of Scotland’s Briefing for MSPs’ (Law Society of Scotland, 9 November 
2016) < www.lawscot.org.uk/media/948527/crim-briefing-scottish-government-debate-working-together-to-
prevent-and-eradicate-hate-crime-and-prejudice-november-2016-3-.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016 
31 ibid, and see now Bracadale Inquiry(n5) 
32 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s96 
33 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, s74  
34 Offences (Aggravated by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009, s1  
35 ibid, s2 
36 ibid 
37 By virtue of the Scotland Act 1998, ss28, 29 and Sch 5, any matter not formally reserved to the UK 
Parliament became a devolved matter within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. See also HL 
Deb 17 June 1998, vol 590 col 1569 per Lord Sewel at Scotland Bill, 2nd reading 
38This article proceeds on the basis that prejudice-motivated speech constitutes part of broader prejudice-
motivated conduct. This is because Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on 
combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L 
328/55, Article 1states that Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the following 
intentional conduct is punishable:(a) publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons 
or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic 
origin;(b) the commission of an act referred to in point (a) by public dissemination or distribution of tracts, 
pictures or other material; 
  
The first relates to public order, wherein policymakers prohibit the expression of hatred on 
the grounds that public order issues may arise. 39  This is not an unduly cautious policy 
position given the UK’s occasional explosions of racial tension.40 The public order rationale 
has undoubtedly always, at least partially, underpinned regulation of prejudice-motivated 
offending in the UK and Scotland both at common law and in statute. Academic evidence is 
provided by Hare, who in addition to correctly identifying the Race Relations Act (RRA) 
1965 (examined shortly) as the first statutory provision directly addressing racial prejudice, 
also comprehensively demonstrates its common law antecedents in the laws of sedition and 
public mischief.41 He restates Stephen’s definition of ‘Sedition’, namely the ‘intention…to 
raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty's subjects, or to promote feelings of ill-
will and hostility between different classes of such subjects’. 42 As regards common law 
‘public mischief’, Hare restates the definition offered by Lord Hewart, CJ, namely ‘all 
offences of a public nature, that is, all such acts or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the 
community’.43 Statutory evidence is provided by the appropriately titled Public Order Act 
1936. It provided, inter alia, that ‘any person who in any public place or at any public 
meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a 
breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be 
guilty of an offence.44 The view that ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour’ 
might stir up racial hatred remains largely unaltered in UK statutory drafting, as can be seen 
in the Public Order Act 1986.45 Hare outlines failed attempts to criminalise incitement to 
religious hatred alongside racial hatred as far back as the passage of the Public Order Bill in 
1936. This not only further evidences the longstanding influence of the ‘public order’ 
rationale, but also usefully illustrates how preventing religious prejudice in law has always 
been significantly more problematic.46 Hare concludes that ‘the rise in ethnic tensions and 
violence following the increase in immigration after the 1950s contributed to the placing of 
                                                          
39 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n7) 177 
40See for example David Renton, ‘The Killing of Blair Peach’, (2014) 36 (10) London Review of Books 
available at <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n10/david-renton/the-killing-of-blair-peach> accessed 15 Jan 2017.  
41 Ian Hare, ‘Crosses, crescents and sacred cows: criminalising incitement to religious hatred’, (2006) (Aut) 
Public Law 521.  
42 Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law (9th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1950), Art.114 as cited in Hare 
(n41),  emphasis added 
43 R v Manley [1933] 1 KB 529 per Lord Hewart CJ at 534, emphasis added 
44 Public Order Act 1936 (1 Edw 8 & 1 Geo 6 c6) s5, emphasis added 
45 Public Order Act 1986, s18(1) A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or 
displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if: (a)he intends 
thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b)having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up 
thereby 
46 As Hare alludes to, England & Wales only legislated in relation to religious hatred in 2006 (the Racial & 
Religious Hatred Act 2006 amending the Public Order Act 1986 by inserting ss29A) after years of failure.   
  
incitement to racial hatred in a class of its own’.47  
The ‘Abhorrence’ Rationale 
Barendt’s second rationale for hate speech proscription in law centres around the widely 
accepted view that ‘it is right for a society to indicate its abhorrence of hate speech and the 
attitudes it reveals and to discourage the spread of racist views, the acceptance of which will, 
in the long run, be seriously harmful to good race relations’.48 He is evidently unconvinced 
by this rationale however, finding that it ‘runs counter to the principle that speech should not 
be inhibited because the government fears that it will affect popular attitudes or that 
individuals will act in response to it in disapproved ways-thinking less well of different ethnic 
groups and refusing to mix with them’.49 He asserts that ‘free speech guarantees that listeners 
will generally be able to make rational assessments of the credibility of the claims made to 
them, whether in the course of election campaigns or in other contexts’, arguing that 
‘proponents of hate speech laws must show why this is not the case with respect to attacks on 
racial, ethnic or other groups’.50 His views largely align with the modern American approach, 
where their courts have been ‘consistently hostile to regulation of “hate speech”, applying the 
First Amendment with vigor and insisting that the solutions to the harm that such speech 
causes is not in suppression but in more speech countering the hateful messages’.51 On the 
available evidence however, Barendt’s opinion runs contrary to the endorsement of the 
‘abhorrence rationale’ evident in EU,52 UK53 and Scottish54 policymaking. 
                                                          
47 Hare (n41) 521 
48 Barendt (n7) 177 
49 ibid 
50 ibid 
51 Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and 
Responses (Cambridge University Press 2012) 3 
52 See, for example Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain 
forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/55, Recital 1. The 
European Agency for Fundamental Rights, Ensuring Justice for Hate Crime Victims: Professional Perspectives, 
foreword states that ‘hate crime is the most severe expression of discrimination and a core fundamental rights 
abuse. It demeans victims and calls into question an open society’s commitment to pluralism and human dignity. 
53 Home Office, ‘Action Against Hate: The UK Government’s plan for tackling hate crime’ (GOV.UK, July 
2016) <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/543679/Action_Against_Hate_-
_UK_Government_s_Plan_to_Tackle_Hate_Crime_2016.pdf> accessed 29 December 2016. The Home 
Secretary’s foreword reflects the abhorrence rationale stating, inter alia, ‘it is utterly unacceptable that people 
should suffer abuse or attacks because of their nationality or ethnic background. We must stand together against 
hate crime and ensure that it is stamped out’ 
54 Scottish Government, ‘Action to tackle Hate Crime and Sectarianism’ (Scottish Government, June 2015)  
< www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/policies/reducing-crime/tackling-hate-crime>  accessed 29 December 2016. The 
abhorrence rationale is reflected in the statement ‘Hate crime has no place in Scotland and will not be tolerated. 
Our justice system is equipped to effectively deal with hate crimes to give victims the confidence to report them 
and bring those responsible to justice’ 
  
The ‘Group’ Rationale 
Barendt describes his third and final justificatory rationale for hate speech proscription as 
‘more promising’.55 This is founded on the view that racist hate speech should be proscribed 
because ‘it is “highly wounding” to members of the targeted group, in some cases inflicting 
psychological injury or causing fear of isolation or physical attack…[and]…more 
generally…[lowering]…the self-esteem of those affected, particularly where there has been 
historical oppression’. 56  Herz and Molnar reinforce this, asserting the existence of a 
‘definitional challenge’ for governments seeking to intervene to proscribe certain forms of 
hate speech, acknowledging that the preferred approach has been based on the ‘general 
understanding that the problematic speech must be directed at a group, or an individual on the 
basis of membership in a group, as opposed to being merely personal’.57  
This appears to be the justificatory rationale at EU level, where, as regards racism, the 
legislature explicitly states that ‘racism and xenophobia constitute a threat against groups of 
persons which are the target of such behaviour’. 58  Barendt further asserts (citing Home 
Office policymaking research) 59 that ‘modern British legislation in this area is generally 
defended now in terms of the hurt racist speech causes members of minority groups’.60 He 
further observes that modern legislation fills a gap in the common law, where, although it 
was perhaps theoretically possible to secure a conviction for attacks on racial groups, in 
practice, prosecutions for sedition and similar conduct on this basis were wholly 
unsuccessful.61 This conclusion reinforces that of Hare.62  
UK & Scottish statutory regulation of racial prejudice: the seeds of the Lord Advocate’s 
lacuna in the ‘group mentality’ 
Hare’s aforementioned exposition of Stephens’ definition of sedition focuses on its opaque 
nature, but is interesting for two other reasons. The first is its use of the term ill-will, a 
description of prejudice-motivated conduct that remains present in anti-prejudice legislation 
                                                          
55 Barendt (n7) 177 
56 Barendt (n7) 177 emphasis added 
57 Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, The Content and Context of Hate Speech (n51) 7 
58 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law [2008] OJ L 328/55, Recital 5 
59 Home Office, Review of Public Order Act 1936 and related provisions (Cmnd 7891, 1980) para 107 
60  Barendt (n7)177 
61 ibid, emphasis added 
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to this day. The second is that, long prior to the introduction of statutory anti-prejudice 
legislation, and long prior to the immigration crises of the 1950s and early 21st century, the 
UK political class clearly perceived UK society as comprising ‘different classes of subjects’ 
(groups). This categorization of citizens therefore substantially predates the Race Relations 
Act (RRA) 1965 and later public order provisions on racial prejudice, as well as the EU 
Council Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia. The drafters’ search for 
appropriate terminology to implement remedial statutory provisions relating to offending 
involving racial prejudice saw Stephens’ ‘classes of subjects’ evolve into ‘any section of the 
public…distinguished  by colour, race, or ethnic or national origins’ in the RRA 1965.63 
This Act proscribed the conduct of publishing or distributing ‘threatening, abusive or 
insulting’ written matter, or the use in any public place or public meeting of ‘threatening, 
abusive or insulting words’64 with ‘intent to stir up hatred against such sections of the public’. 
As such, the group mentality applied to drafting anti-racial prejudice provisions became more 
entrenched. If the concerns of anthropologists such as Omohundro are set aside, 65  this 
entrenchment did not appear unduly problematic. 
The (UK) Public Order Act 1986 represents the first statute to directly implement provisions 
deterring ‘acts intended or likely to stir up racial hatred’,66 and in relation to possession of 
‘racially inflammatory material’. 67  The Act borrowed drafting from its RRA 1965 
predecessor, but narrowed ‘hatred’ to ‘racial hatred’, defining it as ‘hatred against a group of 
persons…defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or 
national origins’.68 Group protection was here to stay. 
The first pre-devolution Act to directly address racial prejudice in Scotland was the Criminal 
Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, as amended by the (UK) Crime and Disorder Act 
1998. This falls within the ambit of Lord Bracadale’s Inquiry.69 This enacted a new Scotland-
specific substantive offence of ‘racially aggravated harassment’,70 which occurs where the 
offender intentionally pursues a racially-aggravated course of conduct (which includes 
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speech) 71 on two or more occasions 72 amounting to harassment (which includes causing 
alarm or distress)73 of a person,74 or the conduct occurs in circumstances where it would 
appear to a reasonable person that it would amount to harassment of that person. 75 The 
offence is also complete if the offender ‘acts in a manner which is racially aggravated and 
which causes, or is intended to cause, a person alarm or distress’.76 It is in this statutory 
provision that the beginnings of what evolved into an identifiable drafting pattern can be 
observed, in that a ‘course of conduct’ or an ‘action’ is racially aggravated if  
(a) immediately before, during or immediately after carrying out the course of conduct or action the 
offender evinces towards the person affected malice and ill-will based on that person's membership 
(or presumed membership) of a racial group; or 
(b) the course of conduct or action is motivated (wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will towards 
members of a racial group based on their membership of that group.77 
Racial group’ means ‘a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality 
(including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins’. 78 ‘Membership’ includes association 
with members of that group, and ‘presumed’ means presumed by the offender. 79  It is 
immaterial whether or not the offender's malice and ill-will is also based, to any extent, on 
the fact or presumption that any person or group of persons belongs to any religious group or 
any other factor.80 
In the absence of accompanying Explanatory Notes, the reason why the definition of the term 
‘racial hatred’ contained in the Public Order Act 1986 81 is not replicated in the racially 
aggravated harassment provisions of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 
(as amended) is not readily evident. ‘Evinces’ seems a carefully chosen word meaning ‘to 
reveal the presence of, or indicate’.82 ‘Racial hatred’ is replaced by ‘malice and ill-will’. This 
may be because proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there was ‘hatred’ on the part of an 
individual offender, a very strong, subjective and emotive term, was thought to be too 
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difficult. Indeed the Scottish provisions actually enacted that require ‘malice and ill-will’ still 
represent a higher threshold of ‘nastiness’ than the counterpart English offence.83 This only 
requires the ‘transient’ and ‘less nasty’ behavioural threshold of ‘demonstrating hostility’ 
towards the victim.84 What can be seen in the finalised Scottish provision is the continuance 
of a drafting pattern that reflects a State policy of categorising marginalised groups felt to be 
in in need of protection from malice or ill-will. It is therefore clear that, more or less from the 
outset, and as the common law was replaced by statutory provisions, the UK’s approach to 
remedying prejudice-motivated offending focused on the perception of individual victims of 
that offending forming part of wider, distinguishable societal ‘classes of persons’, ‘sections of 
the public’ or ‘groups of persons’. This may, where there are obvious distinguishable 
characteristics such as colour, seem conceptually relatively unproblematic, however it will be 
argued herein that distinguishable characteristics pertaining to ‘religious belief’ are virtually 
impossible to ascertain on either an individual or group basis. 
The first Scottish statutory aggravation: racial prejudice 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 additionally introduced section 96, also drafted 
specifically for Scotland. Aggravation of a substantive offence by racial prejudice will occur 
where   
the offender evinces towards the victim (if any) of the offence malice and ill-will based on the 
victim's membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group or the offence is motivated 
(wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will towards members of a racial group based on their 
membership of that group.85 
Unsurprisingly (as they emanate from the same statute) the definitions of ‘member’, 
‘presumed’ and ‘racial group’ replicate those for racially aggravated harassment. 86 More 
importantly for present purposes, the drafting pattern wherein the conduct required (the 
evincing of malice and ill will towards a person based on their membership/presumed 
membership of a group an offender sees as somehow different or repulsive in some way to 
him or her) is now clearly evident.  
Aggravation by Disability-related prejudice: Getting it Right  
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Leaving aside the aggravation by religious prejudice provisions within the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 2003, the drafting pattern as established continues beyond that Act into the 
Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009, section 1, but with a crucial 
distinction. As for the older statutory aggravations by racial or religious prejudice, this 
applies where it is libelled in an indictment, or specified in a complaint, that an offence is 
aggravated by prejudice relating to disability, 87 and subsequently proved.88 An offence is 
aggravated by prejudice relating to disability if: 
(a) at the time of committing the offence or immediately before or after doing so, the offender 
evinces towards the victim (if any) of the offence malice and ill-will relating to a disability 
(or presumed disability) of the victim, or (b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by 
malice and ill-will towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability.89 
Critically for present purposes however, it can be seen that, in addition to providing for 
offending based on the individual disabled person’s membership of a wider vulnerable social 
group (disabled persons more generally), this provision is optimally drafted in that it brings 
within its ambit an individual exhibiting or ‘expressing’ a perceivable disability. Without 
stereotyping disability, it will usually be the case that for someone to be perceived as disabled 
and therefore liable to become subject to prejudice-motivated conduct, they will exhibit or 
express an identifier, indicator, behaviour or other characteristic that identifies them as either 
having a particular individual disability, or exhibit or otherwise express a characteristic that 
identifies them as disabled and part of a wider group of persons with a disability or particular 
disability.   
Aggravation by prejudice relating to sexual orientation or transgender identity 
The same ‘individual expression’ aspect applies in section 2 of the same statute.  
An offence is aggravated by prejudice relating to sexual orientation or transgender identity if, at the 
time of commission or immediately before or afterwards, the offender evinces towards the victim (if 
any) of the offence malice and ill-will relating to (i) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual 
orientation) of the victim, or (ii) the transgender identity (or presumed transgender identity) of the 
victim, or the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will towards persons who have 
(i) a particular sexual orientation, or (ii) a transgender identity or a particular transgender identity.90 
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For the purposes of this provision, ‘sexual orientation’ is described as ‘sexual orientation 
towards persons of the same sex or of the opposite sex or towards both’;91 this is interpreted 
as ‘heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality’.92 ‘Transgender identity’ is reference to 
‘transvestism, transsexualism, intersexuality or having, by virtue of the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004, changed gender, or any other gender identity that is not standard male or female 
gender identity’.93  Government policy states that the definition 
extends expressly to cover other persons under the generality of broad reference to non-standard 
gender identity…[including, but not limited to]…those who are androgynous, of…non-binary gender 
or…otherwise exhibit[ing] a characteristic, behaviour or appearance…[not conforming]… with 
conventional understandings of gender identity.94 
As for disability-related prejudice, the provision covers an individual victim whether or not in 
the context of being part of a wider social group, as well as aggravation by prejudice relating 
to victims perceived as belonging to a wider vulnerable group. Again, without wishing to 
resort to or inflict stereotypes on any member of society, for victims to become victims under 
this provision they will normally have (perhaps unwittingly) exhibited or expressed an 
identifier, indicator, behaviour or characteristic(s) that identify them to those in wider society 
who harbour prejudices against them. 
In encompassing the expressions of individual identity that are rightly held precious by all 
individuals, and ensuring that prejudice-motivated offending against individuals whether or 
not part of some wider group is correctly labelled, sentenced and recorded, the Offences 
(Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009 largely gets things right. Victims covered by 
this Act are not required to actively or passively constitute part of some wider stereotyped, 
vulnerable societal group. They can express their individual personality whatever way they 
see fit, and whether or not they are perceivable to the prejudiced, in the knowledge that Scots 
law will correctly label, sentence and record offending against them. It is in the individual 
expression of religious beliefs or characteristics that the Lord Advocate’s lacuna arises and 
the law lets down individuals like Asad Shah.  
Aggravation by Religious Prejudice in Scotland: the current law 
The drafting used in Scotland’s statutory provisions providing for aggravation by religious 
prejudice represent a virtually verbatim derivative of the UK legislature’s older provisions for 
                                                          
91 ibid, s2(7) 
92 Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) (Act) 2009, Explanatory Note to s2(7) 
93 Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009 s2(8) 
94 Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) (Act) 2009, Explanatory Note to s2(8) 
  
aggravation by racial prejudice previously outlined. The relevant statutory provision is 
section 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. Section 74 is meant to apply ‘where it 
has been either libelled in an indictment or specified in a complaint, and, in either case, 
proved that an offence has been aggravated by religious prejudice’.95 
For the purposes of section 74, an offence is aggravated by religious prejudice if— 
at the time of committing the offence or immediately before or after doing so, the offender evinces 
towards the victim (if any) of the offence malice and ill-will based on the victim's membership (or 
presumed membership) of a religious group, or of a social or cultural group with a perceived 
religious affiliation;96  
or, the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will towards members of a religious 
group, or of a social or cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation, based on their 
membership of that group.97 
It is immaterial whether or not the offender's malice and ill-will is also based (to any extent) 
on any other factor.98  
Critically, for present purposes, section 74 defines ‘religious group’ as: 
a group of persons defined by reference to their religious belief or lack of religious belief, 
membership of or adherence to a church or religious organisation, support for the culture and 
traditions of a church or religious organisation, or participation in activities associated with such a 
culture or such traditions.99 
Aggravation by Religious Prejudice: the gap in the law 
As for racial prejudice, aggravation by religious prejudice only occurs in Scots law where the 
offender’s malice and ill-will is based on his or her perception (correct or otherwise) of their 
victim as belonging to a wider, State-categorised vulnerable group comprising persons 
against which the offender holds prejudice(s). Put another way, section 74 currently only 
extends to acts driven by evinced malice or ill-will founded on religious prejudice and is 
therefore only available to self-confessed or visibly obvious members of a religious group or 
of a social or cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation.  An example of the former 
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would be a Muslim wearing a burkha. An example of the latter would be a member of the 
travelling community. As shown, all Scots law aggravations require the offender to evince 
malice and ill-will towards their victim on the basis of their perception of their victim as 
belonging to some group of persons that they (for reasons only they can ever articulate) find 
somehow irritating or feel some innate hostility towards and who are, in their view, different 
from them. Regrettably, Section 74 would have captured Tanveer Ahmed’s conduct (as 
admitted) had it been motivated by malice and ill-will evinced towards Asad Shah’s 
expressions of personal religious belief if Asad Shah had been a Christian, Jew, Sikh, Hindu, 
Buddhist or indeed any other religion than Tanveer Ahmed. It appears that, as they were both 
Muslims, albeit expressing their faith in very different ways, section 74 could not be applied 
to Ahmed. 
By way of analogy, as Scots law currently stands, if I, as a Presbyterian by birth and belief, 
were to murder a fellow Presbyterian for expressing beliefs about some aspect of 
Presbyterianism that I could not tolerate, I would be murdering them in consequence of my 
intolerance of their expression of religious belief. I would not be murdering them on the 
grounds that I presume they belong to the Presbyterian religious group. I would be 
undoubtedly motivated by religious intolerance, and I would undoubtedly be evincing malice 
and ill will towards my fellow Presbyterian. As such the Crown Office would not be in a 
position to prove an aggravation by religious prejudice as my victim is ostensibly a member 
of the same religious group as me. 
Regrettably therefore, it can be seen that the obvious lacuna is that, as drafted, ‘aggravation 
by religious prejudice’ cannot be applied to offences committed against individuals 
exercising, exhibiting or expressing their own personal take on their fundamental human right 
to freedom of thought, conscience or religion.100 This is surely wrong. Asad Shah expressed 
his personal articulation of religious belief as permitted by this fundamental right but he 
could not be categorised as belonging to any particular ‘religious group’ as currently defined 
in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. Mr Shah was not murdered on account of 
‘malice or ill-will’ towards a ‘group of persons’ to which he was presumed by Tanveer 
Ahmed as belonging. He was murdered on account of the ‘malice or ill-will’ Tanveer Ahmed 
evinced towards his expressed religious beliefs.  
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The issue is therefore (perhaps inadvertently) expressed by Lady Rae in her sentencing 
statement to Tanveer Ahmed based on an agreed narrative: 
This was a…crime, resulting from intolerance…of a wholly innocent man who openly expressed 
beliefs which differed from yours…this was a religiously motivated crime, although it was not 
directed towards the Ahmadi community. 
As such, unlike any other form of aggravation by prejudice in Scotland, Tanveer Ahmed’s 
malice and ill-will towards his victim, although founded on religious grounds, does not 
aggravate his murder of Asda Shah by religious prejudice as a matter of law. 
Implications of the Current lacuna  
This represents a fundamental flaw in the relevant legislative provision, and was correctly 
identified and highlighted by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service as represented 
by the Lord Advocate. It is surely criminal acts or omissions motivated by an offender’s 
malice and ill-will towards individuals expressing their religious belief  that Scots criminal 
law and procedure should be labelling as such, rather than acts motivated by malice or ill-will 
towards ‘presumed members’ of ‘religious groups’. Had this been the case, the appalling 
conduct of Tanveer Ahmed could have been dealt with more appropriately under the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, s74(4A) in that Lady Rae could have exercised the 
implied discretion afforded to the judiciary in s74(4A) (c) to determine an increased sentence 
based on the aggravation and to state so under s74(4A) (d). . 
The current lacuna as identified in Scots law undermines individuals’ rights to State 
protection of their freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and to freely express that 
belief, under the following international treaties: 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 18 and 19;101 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 10 and 11;102 
European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 9, 10 and 14.103 
In addition, the lacuna demonstrates Scotland’s current non-compliance with the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995, which requires States to ‘take 
                                                          
101 Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and to freedom of expression respectively 
102 Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and to freedom of expression respectively 
103 Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and to freedom of expression respectively 
  
appropriate measures to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of 
discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious 
identity’. 104  The use of ‘religious identity’ is particularly noteworthy here as it clearly 
distinguishes the Framework’s requirement upon States to protect individual persons 
vulnerable on account of their religious identity from Scots laws current protection of persons 
only if they can be categorised as falling within a particular religious, social or cultural group. 
As aforementioned, the lacuna also means that the sentencing provisions of the Criminal 
Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, s74 (4A) cannot be applied to crimes motivated by religious 
prejudice in circumstances similar to those  of Tanveer Ahmed discussed herein. As such, 
Lady Rae’s discretion to vary the  sentence was undoubtedly affected (which she made 
implicitly clear) and despite the obvious aggravation by religious prejudice, Tanveer Ahmed 
avoided having his conviction appropriately labelled and possibly attracting heavier 
sanction.105   
Conclusion: Correcting the lacuna 
It is plain from the Justice Secretary’s statement regarding the introduction of new legislation 
if necessary that the Scottish Government is minded to correct the Lord Advocate’s lacuna. 
The terms of reference for Lord Bracadale appear to confirm the Scottish Government’s 
sincerity in the matter. Completely new legislation is not, however, required.  
It is submitted that individual expression or exhibition of personal religious beliefs to wider 
society is sui generis. The issue can be problematic and controversial, however no offence is 
intended when asserting that expressions of race, colour, ethnicity, nationality all involve 
exhibiting or expressing identifiers, indicators, characteristics or physiological features that 
make the individual expressing them perceivable (rightly or wrongly) as belonging to some 
wider ‘group of persons’. Similarly, perceptions (correct or otherwise) of individuals’ sexual 
orientation, transgender identity, age and gender label such individuals as part of a wider 
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societal group. Such groups have been proven to be marginalised to varying degrees in 
varying circumstances, and as such have deservedly attracted protection from international 
and domestic law aimed at preventing discrimination and prejudice directed against those 
groups and individuals presumed to belong to them.  
Expression of religious belief however, simply does not fit this altruistic policy mould. 
Religious expression is an individual act of expression. The protection afforded by ECHR, 
Article 9:  
includes freedom to maintain or to change one's religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or 
disseminate one's religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in public or in 
private...[it]…applies to all personal, political, philosophical, moral and, of course, religious 
convictions. It extends to ideas, philosophical convictions of all kinds, with the express mention of a 
person’s religious beliefs, and their own way of apprehending their personal and social life.106  
As such, state protection for individuals expressing their personal religious beliefs should be 
founded on that very basis. On the specific problem of religious prejudice, this protection 
would be significantly more effective than that currently afforded by the State’s well-
intentioned but ultimately flawed policy decision to categorise individual religious 
practitioners as part of some wider religious, social or cultural group to which victims such as 
Asad Shah simply did not fit. 
It is submitted that Lady Rae, in her sentencing statement for Tanveer Ahmed, inadvertently 
provided a partial draft solution to the problem raised by the Lord Advocate, which could be 
enacted as an amendment to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. The amendment is 
highlighted in bold, 
For the purposes of section 74, an offence is aggravated by religious prejudice if— 
at the time of committing the offence or immediately before or after doing so, the offender evinces 
towards the victim (if any) of the offence malice and ill-will, based on: 
the victim's expression of their personal religious beliefs;  
or the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group, or of a social or cultural 
group with a perceived religious affiliation;   
or, the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will towards members of a religious 
group, or of a social or cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation, based on their 
membership of that group. 
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It is submitted that this simple amendment would close the gap in protection for individuals, 
such as Asad Shah, expressing their personal religious beliefs, and ensure that those who 
evince malice and ill-will based on intolerance of an individual’s expressed religious belief 
fall within the ambit of the legislation. This must surely align with the Scottish Government’s 
wider policy on hate crime. 
 
 
 
